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However, there is little research directly examining the roles and effects of professordirectors on corporate outcomes (e.g., Francis et al. 2014) . To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate whether professor-directors may affect firm outcomes with a specific focus on CSR performance ratings. Prior literature reveals that firm CSR performance is influenced by the characteristics of their board members. For example, firms with female board members are more likely to engage in CSR activities (Mesch et al. 2011; Williams 2003) . Also, Valentine and Fleishman (2008) report that firms are more likely to be involved in CSR activities when the members on the corporate board have higher levels of professional ethical standards.
In this paper, therefore, we investigate whether the presence of professor-directors is associated with CSR performance ratings. Further, we examine post-hoc whether the impact of having professor-directors on CSR performance ratings depends on their academic background. Finally, we investigate whether having professor-directors who hold an administrative position (e.g., Dean, President, Chancellor, etc.) at their universities has a different impact on CSR performance ratings compared to professor-directors without such administrative positions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the relevant prior literature and develop our research question. We then describe the data and present the descriptive statistics of our professor-director sample. Finally, we present our results and provide our conclusions and implications.
Prior Literature and Research Question

Board Heterogeneity and Corporate Outcomes
Numerous studies have investigated the link between board heterogeneity and corporate outcomes (e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2009; Anderson et al. 2011; Cohen et al. 2012; Fich 2005; Güner et al. 2008; Hillman et al. 2000 Hillman et al. , 2001 Masulis et al. 2012; Mesch et al. 2011; Williams 2003) .
1 Following Anderson et al. (2011) , we classify board heterogeneity into two categories -social heterogeneity (e.g., gender, age, and ethnicity) and occupational heterogeneity (e.g., education, experience, and profession) -and review the related literature as follows.
First, as to social heterogeneity in a board, a number of studies have examined the impact of director gender on firm performance and operations (e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2009; Mesch et al. 2011; Willams 2003) . In particular, Williams (2003) investigates the impact of female directors on corporate philanthropy and finds that the number of female directors is positively associated with the level of a firm's involvement in corporate philanthropy. Williams classifies the overall philanthropy activities into four specific types of charitable giving (educational organizations; community service organizations; arts programs; and public policy programs) and reports that female directors exert their influence on corporate philanthropy, particularly to community service organizations and arts programs. Mesch et al. (2011) also investigate gender differences in charitable giving and find that both the likelihood and the amount of giving are greater for female than for male directors, even after controlling for psychological differences (i.e., empathic concern and principle of care measures). Adams and Ferreira (2009) examine the impact of female directors on corporate governance and firm performance and find that the average effect of female directors on firm performance is negative, although female directors provide stronger monitoring effectiveness.
Besides gender diversity, director nationality is also examined in relation to firm performance. Masulis et al. (2012) investigate directors' nationality and document that firms with foreign directors make better cross-border acquisitions if those foreign directors live in the same region as that of the target firm, but report that the net effect of foreign directors on corporate governance and firm performance is negative.
Next, in the literature on occupational heterogeneity in a board, Hillman et al. (2000) argue that occupational differences in directors on the board not only strengthen expertise but also broaden linkages to important external constituencies. In particular, they examine US airline firms undergoing deregulation and conclude that firms respond to significant external environmental changes by altering board composition to reflect the shift in resource needs. Hillman et al. (2001) examine the relation between the presence of stakeholder directors (e.g., suppliers, employees, and community representatives) and stakeholder performance (i.e., corporate social responsibility) and find that certain types of stakeholder directors affect corporate social performance such as diversity and environment. Fich (2005) identifies various occupations of outside directors such as CEOs, professors, bankers, lawyers, and consultants and finds that (1) firms experience long-term performance improvement when they appoint CEOs of other firms as outside directors (i.e., CEO directors) but not when they appoint non-CEO directors and (2) the market reacts more strongly to the appointment of CEO directors than non-CEO directors. These results suggest that CEO directors are perceived in the market as sources of more valuable managerial talent and unique expertise. Güner et al. (2008) examine whether bankers on the board have distinct roles on corporate decisions and report that lending bankers on the board can reduce the debt ratio of a firm while investment bankers increase bond issuances. More recently, Cohen et al. (2012) identify a new type of outside director, i.e., sell-side analysts. They identify outside directors who have covered a firm as sell-side analysts prior to their director appointment and find that firms with analysts on the boards tend to subsequently increase the level of earnings management, which indicates the poor monitoring performance of analyst directors.
Finally, Anderson et al. (2011) explore potential costs and benefits of heterogeneous board and argue that board heterogeneity can bring more resources to the boardroom, which in turn improves the effectiveness or efficacy of monitoring and advising managers. They also compare the impact of social heterogeneity with that of occupational heterogeneity on firm performance and find that while both social and occupational heterogeneity have a positive effect on financial performance, the positive impact of occupational heterogeneity is 50% greater than that of social heterogeneity.
In sum, prior literature suggests that while corporate financial performance is affected by both social and occupational heterogeneity in the board, corporate social performance is primarily influenced by board social (e.g., gender) heterogeneity. As university professors have become a visible source of board heterogeneity (e.g., White et al. 2013 ; see our Table 1 ),
we argue that it is important to examine the potential impact of professor-directors on corporate outcomes.
Professors and Corporate Outcomes
Several studies have investigated the role of professors on the board (e.g., Audretsch
and Lehmann 2006; Audretsch and Stephan 1996; Duchin et al. 2010; Fich 2005; Francis et al. 2014; Güner et al. 2008; Jiang and Murphy 2007; White et al. 2013) . For instance, Audretsch and Stephan (1996) focus on the advisory role of university-based scientists and argue that professors provide three functions to biotech firms: 1) knowledge transfer; 2) signaling the quality of the firm's research to both capital and resource markets; and 3) helping chart the scientific direction of the firm. Fich (2005) finds that while market reactions to director appointments are statistically significant when appointees are CEOs of other firms, these reactions lose significance when appointees are professors. Audretsch and Lehmann (2006) find that the likelihood of having professors on the board is affected by geographic proximity to a university and to an industry. More interestingly, Jiang and Murphy (2007) identify executives who were business school professors and document that firms with former business professors as executives perform significantly better than firms without such executives. Güner et al. (2008) examine whether board members with financial expertise affect corporate policies (e.g., loan, public debt issuances, and acquisitions) and find that finance professors are significantly associated with lower pay-performance sensitivity, but not significantly associated with other policies. White et al. (2013) show that small-and midcap firms are more likely to appoint professors than large firms and that the financial market, on average, positively (insignificantly) reacts to the appointment of professors with science, medicine, and engineering (business) background. Francis et al. (2014) report that the presence of professors is positively associated with firm financial performance and that firms with business-related professors exhibit the best performance, whereas Duchin et al. (2010) document that academic board members do not affect firm financial performance.
In sum, while the aforementioned studies identify professors and examine their differential impacts on various aspects of firms, none to our knowledge solely focuses on the role and impact of professors on corporate social responsibility.
Characteristics of Professors and Corporate Social Responsibility
As other occupations, university professors have their own unique characteristics.
Generally speaking, they are deemed socially obligated in diverse aspects by the public (Baumgarten 1982; Bowman 2005; Charnov 1987; Chickering and Gamson 1999; O'Connell 1998; Tierney 1997) . For example, Baumgarten (1982) argues that university teachers have a social obligation to help other citizens both inside and outside the classroom-the academic profession should have higher ethical standards to seek social benefits in lieu of its own and, accordingly, university professors have obligations toward at least some segments of the community. Charnov (1987) asserts that professors are good citizens as they must take roles in being ethical professionals. Tierney (1997) argues that the three key responsibilities of professors are research, teaching, and service to the university as well as to the community -all of which contribute to society in the long-term. As educators who exercise influence upon the present as well as future generations, professors are obligated to fulfill their own moral responsibilities (O'Connell 1998) and must respect the diversity of talents (Chickering and Gamson 1999) . Finally, Bowman (2005) Ghoshal (2005) argues that business school faculty needs to own up to their roles in creating such scandals and denounces that these scandals happened because they had propagated amoral ideas and theories to their students. Similarly, Bennis and O'Toole (2005) argue that business schools fail to instill norms of ethical behavior into students. Also, Owen (2005) criticizes accounting professors for having neglected the importance of corporate accountability and transparency in the current education system. Finally, Gonin (2007) argues that the civic responsibilities of business scholars and business schools have been questioned as the recent ethical scandals in the business world arise-he attributes these ethical shortcomings to inadequate business education.
2 The Roy Morgan "Image of Professions" Survey, conducted in the spring of 2013 in Australia, asked respondents to rate which professions they consider the most ethical and honest. Results indicated that among all 30 listed professions, university lecturers were ranked in the top one-third, which was higher than the rankings for business executives, lawyers, and accountants.
Because (1) individuals' perceptions or beliefs about professional ethics are positively associated with their attitude toward CSR and (2) CSR attitudes are also positively associated with involvement in CSR activities (Valentine and Fleishman, 2008) , we argue that if professor-directors have higher (lower) levels of ethical standards, they are more (less) likely to promote CSR activities, hence firms are more (less) likely to engage in CSR activities.
Given the relatively mixed evidence about the ethicality of professors, we take an exploratory approach to investigate whether firms with professors on their board of directors exhibit different levels of CSR performance ratings. We formulate our research question as follows:
Research Question: Is the presence of professors on the board of directors associated with CSR performance ratings?
Sample and Data
Our sample is built from RiskMetrics over the period from 2003 to 2011, inclusive.
We first identify professors on the boards of S&P 1500 firms by verifying the primary title and employer of individual directors' biographic information in the RiskMetrics database. We then manually collect each professor's detailed information such as affiliation, academic discipline, and whether the professor holds any administrative position at the university by searching and browsing through their school websites, personal blogs and the press websites (i.e., Forbes and Businessweek). With respect to identifying each professor's academic discipline, we first rely on their highest degree obtained; if this information is not available, we use their current department affiliation (e.g., economics, business, biology, or mathematics) as their academic discipline.
Next, we merge our professor sample with KLD database for CSR performance ratings. Considering that professors also play a major role in socialization of students, we believe that they will most likely influence "Community Donations", "Employee Benefits", and "Diversity Commitment" among the seven CSR dimensions in the KLD database. [Insert Table 1 of which is President (24.30%), followed by Dean (14.64%) and Chair (4.16%).
Results
Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table 2 directors who hold at least three or more directorships in other firms (Masulis et al. 2012 ) and they account for 3.5% of directors. We also find that 3.4% of our firms have an independent 5 We classify majors into seven categories in a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive way.
director who holds more than 5% of a firm's outstanding shares, whereas 57.6% of firms have CEO/Chairman duality. Finally, the mean proportion of professor-directors on the board is 5.1%. Other firm characteristics are consistent with prior literature that covers S&P 1500
firms (e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2009; Masulis et al. 2012 ).
Panel B of Table 2 provides a comparison between firms with and firms without professor-directors. Firms with professors on their board appear to outperform firms without such professor-directors with regards to all CSR performance rating measures (i.e., Community Donations, Employee Benefits, Diversity Commitment, and the composite measure of CSR). Also, firms with professor-directors have larger boards, more female directors, and more independent directors than those without; log (Sales) is significantly higher in firms with professor-directors than those without, indicating that large firms are more likely to appoint professor-directors than small firms. Finally, firms with professordirectors are more mature than those without (30.9 versus 24.9 years), and the return volatility of firms with professor-directors is significantly lower than that of firms without (0.105 versus 0.114). Overall, results in Panel B of Table 2 suggest that the presence of professors on the board may be influenced by certain firm characteristics. Hence, in our regression models, we control for various firm characteristics that may influence firms' decision to appoint professors on their boards.
[Insert Table 2 here]
The Impact of Professor-Directors on CSR Performance Ratings
We begin our analysis using the following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model:
CSR Performance Ratings = β0 + β1 DPROF (or PctPROF) + β2 BoardSize + β3 PctFemale + β4PctOutsider + β5 PctBusyIndepDir + β6IndDirBlock + β7 CEOChair + β8 Market-to-Book + β9Log (Sales) + β10 ROA + β11 Leverage + β12FirmAge + β13 ReturnVolatility + β14 InsiderOwnership + β15 InstitutionalOwnership + Year dummies + Industry dummies + ε.
The above model determines CSR performance ratings as a function of the presence of professor-directors (i.e., DPROF and PctPROF), board-, and firm-specific characteristics. To mitigate concerns that the impact of professor-directors on CSR performance ratings may be driven by correlated omitted variables, we control for several CSR determinants suggested by prior research: proportion of inside directors (Wang and Coffey 1992) , insider ownership and institutional ownership (Barnea and Rubin 2010; Oh et al. 2011) , firm size (Amato and Amato 2007) , and other board-and firm-characteristics such as CEO/Chair duality, firm age, profitability, and leverage (Chen et al. 2008; Barnea and Rubin 2010) . We also include year dummies and SIC 2-digit industry dummies to capture year and industry fixed effects (e.g., Amato and Amato 2007) . In addition, we use standard errors clustered by firm to correct for intra-group correlations of residuals within firms (Petersen 2009 ). Table 3 presents the OLS regression results. We examine the relation between the presence of professor-directors and CSR performance ratings using four different measures of CSR. Except for column (1), which shows an insignificant relation between Community Donations and an indicator for professor-directors on the board (DPROF), columns (3), (5), and (7) provide evidence that firms with at least one professor-director have a significantly higher level of CSR performance ratings. In columns (2), (4), (6), and (8), we examine whether CSR performance ratings increase as more professors sit on the board (PctPROF), and find positive and statistically significant results.
Overall, our control variables show consistent results with prior studies (e.g., Barnea
and Rubin 2010; Mesch et al. 2011; Oh et al. 2011; Williams 2003) . 6 For example, firms with a greater number of female directors (PctFemale) and firms with better financial performance engage more actively in CSR activities. Also, insider ownership is negatively and significantly associated with CSR performance ratings, supporting the notion that firms are reluctant to invest in CSR activities when insiders should bear high CSR expenditure.
[Insert Table 3 here]
CSR and Professor-Directors from Different Academic Disciplines
While we posit that professors have, or at least are expected to have, a higher level of social obligations than other occupations, it is important to recognize that professors constitute a group of heterogeneous professionals who possess different academic training, discipline knowledge, and scholarly experience (White et al. 2013) . Accordingly, in this section, we examine the heterogeneous characteristics of professors and investigate whether the impact of professor-directors on CSR performance ratings varies with their academic backgrounds.
Following White et al. (2013) , we first classify professor-directors into two groups based on their academic fields of study: 1) business professors whose academic backgrounds correspond to either business, economics or law; and 2) specialized professors whose academic backgrounds correspond to either engineering, science or medicine. We then measure the proportion of business professor-directors {PctPROF (Business)} and that of specialized professor-directors {PctPROF (Specialized)} to examine whether they have heterogeneous impacts on CSR performance ratings. Audretsch and Stephan (1996) argue that university-based scientists provide three functions to biotech firms: 1) knowledge transfer, 2) signaling the quality of the firm's research to both capital and resource markets, and 3) help chart the scientific direction of the firm. Thus, specialized professors' role is to provide advice to make a firm succeed in the long run. 8 White et al. (2013) introduce some characteristics of administrative professor-directors. For example, administrative professors may provide appointing firms with beneficial social networks and additional access to resources but, at the same time, they may not be able to provide highly technical and industry-specific advice as it is likely that they have not been active in terms of research since they became administrators at their universities.
on CSR performance ratings is different from that of professor-directors without such position.
Following White et al. (2013) , we first divide professor-directors into two groups based on whether professors hold an administrative position at their universities. Our variables of interest are the proportion of administrative professor-directors {PctPROF (Admin)}, and that of non-administrative professor-directors {PctPROF (No Admin)}. Table 5 here]
Robustness Test and Additional Issues
Endogeneity of Professor-Directors on the Board
While the main purpose of our study is to examine the association between the presence of professor-directors and firm CSR performance ratings as reported in comparison to other business-related occupations (e.g., executives, bankers, and lawyers).
Thus, if some non-professor-directors have networks or connections to a university or professors, it is more likely that professors will have better opportunities to sit on the board of the firm, thereby increasing the proportion of professor-directors. As we cannot measure the individual directors' actual social connections to a university or professors, we alternatively rely on the information of board directorships provided by RiskMetrics and assume that a director has social network to professors if he or she sits on the board of other firms where professors also serve as directors at the same time. Table 6 presents the results of two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions. Column (1) reports the first stage of 2SLS regression. We estimate the OLS regression where the dependent variable is the percentage of professor-directors on the board (PctPROF). We find a positive and significant coefficient (0.031, t-stat = 2.870) on CONNPROF and the result indicates that our instrumental variable can properly explain the endogenous variable, i.e., the presence of professor-directors.
Columns (2)-(5) report the second stage results of 2SLS regressions where dependent variables are CSR performance ratings and the endogenous variable (PctPROF) is replaced with the fitted value (Fitted-PctPROF) obtained from the first stage regression. We find that the percentage of professor-directors is still significantly and positively associated with CSR performance ratings, suggesting that professor-directors indeed appear to increase the level of firm CSR performance ratings. All other specifications are identical to those in Table 3 .
[Insert Table 6 here]
CSR and Temporal Change in the Number of Professor-Directors
In the preceding section we provide some statistical evidence that professor-directors do positively affect firm CSR performance ratings. To further investigate the causal relationship between a firm's CSR and the presence of professor-directors, we conduct additional tests by incorporating temporal dimensions in this section. That is, we capture the temporal change in the presence of professor-directors and examine its relation to firm CSR activities.
First, to allow for a rather long-term oriented CSR investment, we measure the change in the number of professor-directors over two consecutive years {△NPROF (t)} and include two lags of the change in the number of professor-director, △NPROF (t-1) and △NPROF (t-2), together in the regression models. 12 The untabulated results indicate that the change in the number of professor-directors in year t is positively associated with the composite measure of CSR at 10 percent level. Further, the change in the number of professor-directors in year t is more strongly and positively associated with the strengths of CSR performance ratings (i.e., strengths in community donations, diversity community, and CSR), suggesting that the change in the number of professor-directors is associated with the level of firm CSR performance ratings this year.
13
Second, we measure the dismissal of professor-directors from the board as an indicator that equals one if a firm begins to have no professors on its board from this year while it previously had, and zero otherwise {DismissPROF (t)}. We then estimate the regressions of CSR performance ratings on DismissPROF (t), DismissPROF (t-1), DismissPROF (t-2) and control variables. Untabulated results show that the past dismissal of professor-directors is negatively (positively) and significantly associated with the current level of firm CSR net performance and strengths (weaknesses). Hence, these results suggest that firm CSR performance ratings tend to weaken if professor-directors are dismissed in the 12 We find inferentially similar results when the change in the proportion of professor-directors (△PctPROF) is used. 13 In the next section, we provide the rationale or justification for decomposing our CSR dependent variables (in the form of net difference scores) into CSR strengths and weaknesses.
preceding years. 14 Overall, our additional analyses suggest that the presence of professordirectors appear to affect firm CSR performance ratings.
15
CSR Strengths vs. Weaknesses as Dependent Variables
Our dependent variables are measured as the net difference scores between CSR strengths and weaknesses, the metrics of which are widely used in prior literature that relies on the KLD database (e.g., Barnea and Rubin 2010; Chen et al. 2008; Rekker et al. 2012 ).
However, a few studies have demonstrated that difference scores suffer from methodological problems such as potential unreliability, systematic and spurious correlations with their components (Allison 1990; Edwards and Parry 1993; Johns 1981) . Thus, in this section, we rerun our tests using the dependent variables decomposed into strengths and weaknesses in CSR. We then examine which aspect of CSR performance ratings (i.e., strengths vs.
weaknesses) is actually affected by the presence of professor-directors. Untabulated results
show that strengths in CSR performance ratings are all positively and significantly associated with the presence of professor-directors. However, none of the weaknesses in CSR performance ratings show statistical significance with respect to the presence of professordirectors, although the signs of their relations are all negative as expected. Taken together, these results imply that our findings (using net difference scores) remain qualitatively the same as when dependent variables are decomposed into strengths and weaknesses, and that professor-directors are primarily associated with firm CSR strengths.
14 We were not able to find clear evidence that firm CSR performance ratings increase when a new professordirector is added to the board. 15 We acknowledge some possible limitations in this section. To examine how CSR activities are associated with temporal changes in the presence of professor-directors, we adopt and modify a research design that LaFond and Watts (2008) use (i.e., CSR (t) = △Prof (t) + △Prof (t-1) + △Prof (t-2) + controls (t-1)) in which the dependent variable is the CSR rating level while the variables of interest are the longitudinal changes in the presence of professor-directors. As CSR scores provided by the KLD database are relatively sticky and insensitive over time, taking the change (△) of KLD variables does not capture a subtle change in CSR ratings over two consecutive years.
Conclusions and Implications
Over the last decade, more than one third of S&P 1500 firms have appointed professors as directors on their boards. The extant literature provides relatively mixed evidence about the ethicality of professors. On one hand, professors are generally perceived as having, or at least being expected to have, a relatively higher standard of professional ethics (Baumgarten 1982; Bowman 2005; Charnov 1987; Chickering and Gamson 1999; O'Connell 1998; Tierney 1997 Our study contributes to the extant literature in several aspects. First, we document that a less-investigated but important occupation (i.e., university professor) among outside directors has an impact on CSR performance ratings. Considering that a significant portion of firms appoint at least one academic on their board of directors, we believe that it is worthwhile to investigate whether the presence of professor-directors affects corporate outcomes. Second, this study assesses how a particular type of corporate governance characteristic and its projected role link to a corporate activity, namely corporate social responsibility. Last but certainly not least, we document how professors can potentially contribute to society outside the classroom by showing the positive impact of professordirectors on firm CSR performance ratings. This implies that CSR performance ratings, on average, are likely to increase with professors appointed in corporate boardrooms.
As in all empirical investigations, ours is subject to some limitations. Our study focuses on a sample of relatively large US firms (i.e., S&P 1500). Given that interest in corporate social responsibility as well as the role and influence of professors may vary across countries (owing to their differences in terms of culture, business regulations and politics), the extent to which the results are generalizable outside the US setting cannot be determined.
Further, as mentioned earlier, the KLD database is limiting in that the provided rating scores are relatively sticky and insensitive over time; hence, it was not desirable to take the change (△) of KLD variables to capture a subtle change in CSR ratings over two consecutive years.
Finally, we purely rely on archival data and quantitative analyses, and this does not necessarily give a complete picture and understanding with regards to the process of how professors may help firms make more socially responsible decisions. Accordingly, future research that may consider more qualitative explorations in the form of interviews and/or surveys would bring more insights on how professors on the board actually exert their moral values and influences into firms in undertaking CSR activities. Therefore, extensions of our work along each of these limiting dimensions mentioned above would appear to be warranted. Variable definitions
The sum of strengths minus the sum of weaknesses in Community dimension of KLD.
Employee Benefits
The sum of strengths minus the sum of weaknesses in Employee Relations dimension of KLD.
Diversity Commitment
The sum of strengths minus the sum of weaknesses in Diversity dimension of KLD.
CSR
The sum of strengths minus the sum of weaknesses in three dimensions of KLD (i.e., Community, Employee Relations, and Diversity). PctPROF
The percentage of professor-directors on the board. DPROF 1 if a firm has professor-directors on the board, and 0 otherwise.
PctPROF (Business)
The percentage of business professor-directors on the board. Business professor is a professor of business, economics, or law. PctPROF (Specialized)
The percentage of specialized professor-directors on the board. Specialized professor is a professor of engineering, science, or medicine. PctPROF (Admin)
The percentage of professor-directors who hold administrative positions at their universities (e.g., President, Dean, Chair, Chancellor, Head, and Provost).
The percentage of professor-directors who do not hold administrative positions at their universities. BoardSize
The number of directors sitting on the board.
PctFemale
The percentage of female directors on the board.
PctOutsider
The percentage of independent directors on the board.
PctBusyIndepDir
The percentage of independent directors who hold 3 or more other directorships in the RiskMetrics universe firms. IndDirBlock 1 if a firm has an independent director who holds more than 5% of shares outstanding and 0 otherwise. CEOChair 1 if a CEO is also the chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise.
Market-to-Book
The ratio of market value to book value of assets, measured at the fiscal year end.
Log (Sales) Natural logarithm of sales, measured at the fiscal year end.
ROA
Operating income before depreciation scaled by book value of total assets, measured at the fiscal year end. Leverage
The book value of short-term and long-term debt divided by the book value of total assets, measured at the fiscal year end. FirmAge
The number of years the firm has appeared in CRSP.
ReturnVolatility Standard deviation of a firm's previous 60-month stock returns.
InsiderOwnership
The sum of shares held by top 5 executives divided by the total number of shares outstanding.
InstitutionalOwnership
The average percentage of shares held by institutions during the fiscal year.
CONNPROF
The percentage of non-professor-directors on the board who sit on other boards on which there are professor-directors. (Petersen 2009 ). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. (Petersen 2009 ). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
